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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model of a war against the producers of illegal hard drugs. This war occurs
on two fronts. First, to prevent the cultivation of crops that are the raw material for producing drugs
the state engages the drug producers in conflict over the control of arable land. Second, to impede
further the production and exportation of drugs the state attempts to eradicate crops and to interdict
drug shipments. The model also includes an interested outsider who uses both a stick and a carrot
to strengthen the resolve of the state in its war against drug producers. The results of the calibration
of the model yield an estimate that from 2001 through 2003 subsidies from the United States to the
Colombian armed forces under Plan Colombia caused a decrease in the exportation of drugs from
Colombia to about 44 percent of what exportation was before Plan Colombia was implemented. The
results of the calibration of the model also suggests that a more efficient allocation of the about $2
billion that the United States spent on Plan Colombia through 2003 would have involved larger















In many countries the state’s control over much of the land within its recog-
nized borders is tenuous and depends on the state’s willingness to use armed force
against challengers to its authority. This problem is especially acute in coun-
t r i e sl i k eC o l o m b i ai nw h i c ht h em o s tp r o ﬁtable use of much arable land is the
cultivation of crops that are the raw material for the production of illegal hard
drugs – speciﬁcally, coca, which is the raw material for producing cocaine, and
opium poppies, which are the raw material for producing heroin. The production
of cocaine from coca base and the production of heroin from opium-poppy juice
are relatively simple processes, requiring only the combining of the cultivated raw
materials with a few chemicals in small scale local workshops.
Because almost all of the hard drugs produced in countries like Colombia
are exported, the state typically faces international pressure – in the case of
Colombia mainly from the United States – to make war against the organizations
that organize and direct the production and exportation of hard drugs. These
organizations are the residual claimants to the net revenues from this trade. We
call these organizations for short the “drug producers”.
This paper develops a model of a war against the drug producers. The war
occurs on two fronts. First, to prevent the cultivation of coca and opium poppies
the state engages the drug producers in conﬂict over the control of arable land.
Second, to impede further the production and exportation of drugs the state
attempts to eradicate crops of coca and opium poppies, mainly by aerial spraying
of herbicides on arable land that the drug producers control, and to interdict
s h i p m e n t so fd r u g s ,m a i n l yb yr a i d i n gthe workshops where drugs are produced
and stored, by destroying landing strips from which drugs are exported, and by
attacking airplanes that are transporting drugs.
Importantly, the model allows for an interested outsider who uses both a stick
and a carrot to strengthen the resolve of the state in its war against the drug
producers. The model shows how the eﬀorts and successes of the state on the two
fronts in this war depend on this stick and carrot as well as on the technology ofconﬂict over land and on the technologies of eradication and interdiction.
We also calibrate the model for the well documented case of Colombia. In this
c a l i b r a t i o nw et a k et h es t a t et ob et h eC o l o m b i a ng o v e r n m e n t ,t h ed r u gp r o d u c -
ers to be the two outlaw groups, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC) and the Autodefenses Unidas de Colombia (AUC),1 and the interested
outsider to be the government of the United States. Our calibration yields an
estimate that from 2001 through 2003 subsidies from the United States to the
Colombian armed forces under Plan Colombia caused a decrease in the exporta-
tion of drugs from Colombia to about 44 percent of what exportation was before
Plan Colombia was implemented.2,3 Our calibration also yields the estimate that
the marginal cost to the United States of decreasing the exportation of drugs from
1According to many observers – see, for example, Rabasa and Chalk (2001), Echeverry
(2004), Thoumi (2003), and UNODC (2003) – since the demise of the Medellín and Cali
cartels in the 1990s, FARC and AUC, their historical origins as “leftist” guerrillas and “rightist”
paramiltaries notwithstanding, have become the organizations that organize and direct most of
the Colombian production and exportation of hard drugs, mainly cocaine and a relatively small
amount of heroin. Bottía (2003) and Diaz and Sanchez (2004) use data from municipalities
to conﬁrm a high correlation between drug production and the control of arable land by the
FARC and the AUC. Rangel Suárez (2000) tells us that at one time FARC only taxed and
provided security for the various stages of drug production and exportation – the cultivation
of coca, the manufacturing of cocaine from coca base, and the traﬃcking of cocaine – but that
subsequently FARC began itself, as it does now, to organize and to direct the production and
exportation of drugs. Rangel Suárez also discusses the other criminal activities, such as extortion
and kidnaping, in which the Colombian outlaw groups engage. Our model abstracts from these
activities. Naranjo (2003) analyzes a model in which FARC, as in former times, only taxes
and provides security for production and exportation. Also, Naranjo focuses on eradication and
interdiction, but he abstracts from conﬂict over control of arable land.
2Although appropriations for Plan Colombia began in 2000, we focus on 2001 through 2003
because Plan Colombia’s gestation period seems to have lasted until the end of 2000. For
example, a crucial component of subsidies to the Colombian armed forces has been the provision
of helicopters. According to the General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO, 2003), these helicopters ﬂew
their initial missions only in December 2000.
3As Colombia is not the only source of importation of hard drugs into the United States,
a relatively large decrease in exportation from Colombia does not necessarily imply that total
importation of hard drugs decreased by a comparable amount.
2Colombia was much smaller for subsidies for the conﬂict over control of arable land
than for subsidies for eradication and interdiction eﬀorts. This estimate suggests
that a more eﬃcient allocation of subsidies to the Colombian armed forces, on
which the United States spent about $2 billion through 2003, would have involved
larger subsidies for the conﬂict over control of arable land and smaller subsidies
for eradication and interdiction eﬀorts.4
2. The Model
2.1. Conﬂict over Arable Land
Assume that there are n drug producers, n ∈ {1,2,3,...}, who, for simplicity, are
identical in all relevant respects, and let area i, i =1 ,2,...,n, denote the arable
land that the state contests with the ith drug producer. Also, assume that area i
and area j, j =1 ,2,...n, j 6= i, comprise disjoint sets, each consisting of L/n
hectares. Hence, the total amount of arable land that the state contests with the
drug producers is L hectares.
Let the outcome of the conﬂict over arable land between the state and the
ith drug producer be that, although the state can have more or less success over
time, on average the state controls the fraction Pi of area i. Assume that the
4Despite some minor accounting discrepancies several sources agree that through 2003 the
United States spent about $2 billion on Plan Colombia. See CIP (2004), GAO (2003), and
Wood (2003). Initially subsidies to the Colombian armed forces were limited to eradication
a n di n t e r d i c t i o ne ﬀorts, but subsequently subsidies were made available for the conﬂict over
control of arable land. “In response to increased violence in Colombia during early 2002 and the
recognition that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are inextricably linked, the Congress
provided ‘expanded authority’ for the use of the U.S. assistance to Colombia. This authority
enables the government of Colombia to use the U.S.-trained and -equipped counternarcotics
brigade, the U.S.-provided helicopters, and other U.S.-provided counternarcotics assistance to
ﬁght groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to ﬁght drug traﬃcking.” (GAO,
2003, p. 10)
3technology of conﬂict over arable land is such that Pi is determined, according








1 Xi =0 ,
(2.1)
where Zi and Xi denote the resources, valued in dollars, that the state and
the ith drug producer, respectively, allocate annually to their conﬂict over arable
land.
The positive parameter, Φ, in equation 2.1 measures the relative eﬀectiveness
of the resources that a drug producer allocates to this armed conﬂict. Although
the armed forces of the state have the advantage of better training and more
advanced weaponry, the drug producers have the advantage of a cheaper pool of
labor from which to recruit their ﬁghters and the use of guerrilla tactics. If these
advantages are approximately oﬀsetting, then Φ is approximately equal to one.
According to equation (1), if both Zi and Xi are positive, then the state controls
some, but not all of area i, with Pi being an increasing concave function of the
ratio, Zi/ΦXi.
The n drug producers also contest with each other the control of the arable
land, consisting of
P
i(1−Pi)Li hectares, that the state does not control.5 Let the
outcome of the conﬂict between the drug producers be that, although the ith drug
producer can have more or less success over time, on average the ith drug producer
controls the fraction pi of
P
i(1−Pi)Li. Assume that the technology of conﬂict
between the drug producers is such that pi is determined, again according to a
standard contest-success function, by
5As an example, the publication Revista Cambio, “Tiempo de muerte y de cosecha”,
8/8/2004, reports that the FARC and the AUC are engaged in an armed conﬂict for control of
land in the region of Catatumbo (northeast of Bogotá), where approximately 30,000 hectares
of coca are planted. A major Colombian newspaper recently reported violent confrontations
between FARC and AUC in the Sierra Nevada for the control of workshops where cocaine is










0 yi =0 ,
(2.2)
where yi and yj denote the resources, valued in dollars, that the ith drug
producer and the jth drug producer, respectively, allocate to the conﬂict between
the drug producers.
Equation 2.2 assumes that the resources that the n drug producers allocate
to conﬂict among themselves are equally eﬀective. Hence, pi is an increasing
concave function of the ratio, yi/
P
j6=i yj. If both
P
i(1 − Pi)Li and yi are
positive, then the ith drug producer controls a positive amount of arable land.
2.2. Eradication and Interdiction
Let the outcome of the state’s eradication and interdiction eﬀorts be that, although
these eﬀorts can be more or less successful over time, on average the ith drug
producer successfully exports the fraction qi of the drugs that potentially could
be produced from crops grown on the land that it controls. Assume that the
technologies of eradication and interdiction are such that qi is determined, again








1 zi =0 ,
(2.3)
where zi denotes the value in dollars of the resources that the state allocates
annually to its eradication and interdiction eﬀorts against the ith drug producer,
and where xi denotes the value in dollars of the resources that the ith drug
producer allocates annually to thwarting the state’s eradication and interdiction
eﬀorts.
The positive parameter, φ, in equation 2.3 measures the eﬀectiveness of the
resources that a drug producer allocates to preventing eradication and interdiction
5relative to the resources that the state allocates to its eradication and interdiction
eﬀorts. As eradication and interdiction seem to be easier to avoid than to accom-
plish, φ is probably larger than one. According to equation 2.3, if both zi and
xi are positive, then the state prevents the exportation of some, but not all, of
the drugs that the ith drug producer potentially could produce from crops grown
o nt h el a n dt h a ti tc o n t r o l s ,w i t h qi being a decreasing convex function of the
ratio, zi/φxi.
2.3. The Drug Producers
The ith drug producer’s average annual net revenue, denoted by Ri, is given by
Ri = qi cp i
X
i
(1 − Pi)L/n − (Xi + yi + xi), (2.4)
where c denotes the potential annual proﬁts in dollars from each hectare
of contested land used to cultivate crops from which hard drugs are produced.
A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n2 . 4t h eith drug producer’s average annual gross revenue is
the product of the amount of land the ith drug producer controls, pi
P
i(1−Pi)L/n,
potential proﬁts per hectare, c, and the fraction of its potential production that
the ith drug producer successfully exports, qi. Equation 2.4 also assumes that
the total value of the resources that the ith drug producer allocates annually to
its conﬂicts with the state and with the other drug producers equals the sum,
Xi+yi+xi. This assumption abstracts from complementarities in the technology
of conﬂict, such as might be associated with centralized command and control.
The ith drug producer chooses Xi,y i, and xi to maximize Ri, taking
c, Zi,y j,P j, and zi as given. Accordingly, in the conﬂi c to v e ra r a b l el a n d
between the ith drug producer and the state, the ith drug producer’s choice of Xi,
assuming an interior solution, satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition:
∂Ri
∂Xi
= −qi cp i
∂Pi
∂Xi
L/n − 1=0 .
6Using equation 2.1 to calculate ∂Pi/∂Xi, this ﬁrst order condition becomes
(ΦXi + Zi)
2 = Φ Zi qi cp i L/n. (2.5)
T u r n i n gt ot h ec o n ﬂict among the drug producers o v e rt h ea r a b l el a n dt h a t
the state does not control, the ith drug producer’s choice of yi, assuming an








(1 − Pi)L/n − 1=0 .











(1 − Pi)L/n. (2.6)
Combining this ﬁrst-order condition with the analogous ﬁrst-order condition
for the choice of yj, we obtain




Substituting yi = yj into equation 2.2 we ﬁnd that pi equals 1/n. Unsur-
prisingly, given that the resources that the two drug producers allocate to conﬂict
between them are equally eﬀective, each drug producer gains control of an equal
amount of the contested land that the state does not control.
Finally, analyzing the drug producers’ allocation of resources to thwarting the
state’s eﬀorts at eradication and interdiction, the ith drug producer’s choice of xi,









(1 − Pi)L/n − 1=0 .
Using equation 2.3 to calculate ∂qi/∂xi, this ﬁrst-order condition becomes
(φxi + zi)
2 = φ zi cp i
X
i
(1 − Pi)L/n. (2.7)
2.4. The State and the Interested Outsider
The interested outsider uses both a stick and a carrot in an attempt to strengthen
the resolve of the state in its war against the drug producers. The stick is the
threat that the interested outsider will label the state a “narco-state,” and as a
result the state will be ostracized by the international community.
Assume that from the perspective of the state the decision of the interested
outsider to apply the label “narco-state” includes a stochastic element. To allow
for this stochastic element, let λ denote the number of kilograms of drugs that
without eradication could be produced annually from the crops harvested on a
hectare of land, and let D denote the total amount of hard drugs exported




qi(1 − Pi)L/n. (2.8)
Assume that the state perceives the probability of its being labeled a narco-
state to be equal to the ratio, D/λL, where λL is the amount of drugs that
potentially could be produced and exported annually. In calibrating the model
for the case of Colombia we assume, as seems historically accurate, that this per-
ception existed before the implementation of Plan Colombia and was not aﬀected
by Plan Colombia.
Let h denote the annual cost in dollars that the state anticipates would result
from its being labeled as a narco-state. Thus, the expected annual cost associated
8with the possibility of being labeled as a narco-state equals the product of h and
the probability, D/λL.
The carrot used by the interested outsider is a subsidy to the armed forces of
the state. This subsidy consists of a fraction, 1 − Ω, of the resources that the
state allocates to its conﬂicts with the drug producers over control of arable land
and a fraction, 1 − ω, of the resources that the state allocates to its eradication
and interdiction eﬀorts.
Given this stick and carrot, the state’s expected annual net payoﬀ from its war











where b denotes the annual proﬁt in dollars from each hectare of contested
land that the state controls and uses to cultivate the most proﬁtable benign
crop. Given equation 2.9, the term, hD/λL, which is the expected annual
cost associated with the possibility of being labeled as a narco-state, equals
h
P
i qi(1 − Pi)/n.
Equation 2.9 assumes that the total value of the resources that the state al-
locates annually to its war against the drug producers over arable land is
P
i Zi
and that the total value of the resources that the state allocates annually to its
eradication and interdiction eﬀorts is
P
i zi. These assumptions accord with the
assumption that area i and area j comprise disjoint sets and also abstract from
complementarities in the technology of conﬂict. Equation 2.9 also assumes, for
simplicity, that the state takes no account of the havoc that results from its war
against the drug producers.
The state chooses Zi and zi to maximize S, taking b, Xi,x i,h ,Ω, and
ω as given. Accordingly, the state’s choice of Zi, again assuming an interior









− Ω =0 .
9Using equation 2.1 to calculate ∂Pi/∂Zi, this ﬁrst order condition becomes
(ΦXi + Zi)
2 =( bL + hqi) Φ Xi /n Ω. (2.10)
Finally, turning to the state’s eﬀorts at eradication and interdiction, the state’s










(1 − Pi) − ω =0 .
Using equation 2.3 to calculate ∂qi/∂zi, this ﬁrst-order condition becomes
(φxi + zi)
2 = h φ xi (1 − Pi) /n ω. (2.11)
2.5. The Outcome of the War Against Drug Producers
Given that the n drug producers are identical, an equilibrium exists in which the
vector {xi,z i,X i,Z i} equals {x,z,X,Z} for all i and, accordingly, in which
the vector {qi,P i} equals {q,P} for all i. Using these equalities, recalling that
pi equals 1/n, and solving equations 2.5 and 2.10 and equations 2.7 and 2.11










6For simplicity the following solutions assume that b equals zero. As long as b is small
relative to the product of q and c, this simpliﬁcation is innocuous. See the appendix for






























These solutions for resource allocations imply the equilibrium outcomes on
the two fronts of the war against drug producers. Substituting equations 2.12 and
2.13 into equation 2.1 we obtain






According to equation 2.16 the fraction of the contested land that the drug pro-
ducers control is an increasing function of Φ and Ω, an unsurprising result, and
is also a decreasing function of n and of the ratio of h to cL. To understand the
eﬀect of n, recall that, because of the conﬂi c to v e ra r a b l el a n da m o n gt h ed r u g
producers, each drug producer retains control of only the fraction, 1/n, of the
land that the state does not control. Accordingly, the larger is n the smaller is
the payoﬀ to each drug lord from the resources allocated to conﬂict with the state
over arable land and, hence, the smaller is the amount of resources that each drug
producer allocates to this conﬂict.







11According to equation 2.17 the fraction of potential drug production that the drug
producers successfully export is an increasing function of φ and ω, another
unsurprising result, and is a decreasing function of the ratio of h to cL.
Finally, from equation 2.8 we have
D = λ q (1 − P) L. (2.18)
From equations 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18, we see that the interested outsider can eﬀect
a decrease in D, the annual exportation of drugs, either by decreasing Ω, and
hence decreasing 1 − P, or by decreasing ω, and hence decreasing q.
2.6. The Cost for the Interested Outsider
Let M denote the dollar amount of annual subsidies from the interested outsider
to the armed forces of the state, where
M = n [(1 − Ω) Z +( 1 − ω) z]. (2.19)
From equation 2.19 the marginal cost for the interested outsider of decreasing Ω















From equation 2.18 the marginal eﬀect of decreasing Ω on the exportation of







12Let (∂M/∂D)Ω denote the marginal cost, measured in dollars per kilogram,
for the interested outsider of decreasing the exportation of drugs by decreasing Ω.
From equations 2.20 and 2.21, using equation 2.13 to calculate ∂Z/∂Ω, equation
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(2.22)
Turning to subsidies to eradication and interdiction, from equation 2.19 the
















From equation 2.18 the marginal eﬀect of decreasing ω on the exportation of






(1 − P) L. (2.24)
Let (∂M/∂D)ω denote the marginal cost, measured in dollars per kilogram,
for the interested outsider of decreasing the exportation of drugs by decreasing ω.
From equations 2.23 and 2.24, using equation 2.13 to calculate ∂Z/∂q,e q u a t i o n

































13Under an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies (∂M/∂D)Ω, as given by equation 2.22,
and (∂M/∂D)ω, as given by equation 2.25, would be equal.
3. Calibration of the Model
3.1. Plan Colombia: How Successful?
To calibrate the model for the case of Colombia we begin with the following facts
about Colombia provided by the United Nations Oﬃce for Drug Control (UNODC,
2004):
i. Opium poppies were cultivated only on a relatively small amount of land.
Accordingly, we focus on the production and exportation of cocaine. The amount
of land on which coca was cultivated, (1 − P)L, decreased from about 163,300
hectares in the year 2000, before the implementation of Plan Colombia, to about
144,000 hectares in 2001, 102,000 hectares in 2002, and 86,000 hectares in 2003, for
an average of about 110,900 hectares after the implementation of Plan Colombia.
Thus, on average Plan Colombia has decreased the amount of land that the drug
producers have controlled to about 0.68 of what it was before the implementation
of Plan Colombia
ii. Without eradication on average the coca harvested on a hectare of land
yields annually about 4.7 kilograms of coca base, and about one kilogram of
cocaine can be produced from a kilogram of coca base. Hence, λ equals about
4.7 kilograms.
iii. During years 2000 through 2003 the drug producers paid the farmers who
cultivate coca on average $830 for a kilogram of coca base. Hence, for the product
of each hectare of land on which coca is cultivated, the drug producers paid on
average the product of 4.7 and $830 per year, which is about $3900.7
7Although during some months the drug producers paid as little as $750 per kilogram of coca
base and as much as $965 per kilogram per kilogram of coca base, the amounts paid for coca
base exhibit no trend.
14Also, in calibrating the model we use the fact that for 2001 through 2003,
M, average annual spending by the United States on subsidies to the Colombian
armed forces under Plan Colombia was about $2/3 billion, and we take n, the
number of drug producers, to be two – FARC and AUC.
In order to reconcile these facts with our model we begin by assuming (in the
median scenario of the calibrations, columns 1 and 2 of Table 1) that c, potential
annual proﬁts from each hectare of land used to cultivate coca, equals twice the
average cost of production of a kilogram of cocaine. Assuming that the cost of
converting a kilogram of coca base into cocaine (which includes a few chemicals,
microwave ovens and the costs of operating the workshop) is about $1000, then
the total cost of producing a kilogram of cocaine is about $5000. Hence, c equals
about two times this cost, or about $10.000. This assumption implies that in
pricing cocaine the drug producers apply a mark-up of 200 per cent to the cost of
producing one kilogram of cocaine.8 Importantly, our main conclusions are robust
to large variations in c. In Table 1 we also report the implications of assuming
that c equals $8000 (columns 7 and 8), and $12000 (columns 9 and 10).
With regard to the technology of conﬂi c to v e rl a n da n dt h et e c h n o l o g i e so f
eradication and interdiction, we begin by assuming in the median scenario that
Φ, t h er e l a t i v ee ﬀectiveness of the resources that the drug producers allocate to
conﬂict with the state over control of land, equals one, and that φ, the rela-
tive eﬀectiveness of the resources that the drug producers allocate to preventing
eradication and interdiction, equals two. Our main conclusions are also robust to
large variations in φ. In Table 1 we report the implications of assuming that φ
8Echeverry (2004) presents two estimates of the net income derived from the production of
cocaine in Colombia during 2001 and 2002. These estimates are $1.9 billion (2.3% of Colombian
GDP in 2000) and $3.3 billion (3.9% of GDP). Using these two estimates we calculate the net
income of cocaine production (without interdiction costs) per hectare of land cultivated with
coca to be between $11000 and $15000. These two numbers, although higher than the number
we use in the median scenario, are not too far from our assumption about c, especially given
the fact that his estimates are for the whole chain of cocaine exportation in Colombia.
15equals 1.5 (columns 3 and 4), and 2.5 (columns 5 and 6).
In the median scenario of the calibrations we will use a value of h, the annual
cost in dollars that the Colombian state anticipates would result from its being
labeled as a narco-state, to be $4 billion dollars (approximately 4.6% of GDP).
In Table 1 we also report the implications of assuming that h equals $2 billion
(columns 11 and 12), and $6 billion (columns 13 and 14).
Before the implementation of Plan Colombia, (1 − P) L was equal to 163,300
hectares. With Ω and ω equal to one (before the implementation of Plan
Colombia), n equal to two, and taking a value of h equal to $4 billion, using
equation 2.16 to solve for the equality (1 − P) L =1 6 3 ,300 implies that L,t h e
amount of arable land that the state contests with the drug producers, has been
about 450 thousand hectares. Table 1 reports the implied values of L if we assume
diﬀerent values of c (columns 7 through 10) and h (columns 11 through 14). Hence,
before the implementation of Plan Colombia, equation 2.16 implies that 1−P was
equal to 0.36 in the median scenario. In addition, with φ equal to two, equation
2.17 implies that before implementation q was about 0.69 in the median scenario.
Given that the ratio of 1 − P after implementation to 1 − P before imple-
mentation has been about 0.68, and given that before implementation Ω was











With Φ equal to one, n equal to two, h equal to $4 billion dollars, and c
equal to $10000, equation 3.1 implies that after implementation Ω has been about
0.57. Table 1 reports the implied values of Ω for variations in c and h. Moreover,
with the parameter values of the median scenario, equation 2.16 implies that after
implementation 1 − P has decreased from 0.36 to about 0.25.
The results of the calibration of the model in the median scenario imply that
the probability of being labeled a narco-state perceived by the Colombian gov-
16ernment decreased from 25% before the implementation of Plan Colombia to 11%
after its implementation.
Substituting equations 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17 into equation 2.19, and setting
M equal to $2/3 billion, under the parameter values of the median scenario we
calculate that after implementation ω has equaled about 0.37. In addition, with
φ equal to two and ω equal to about 0.37, equation 2.17 implies that after
implementation q has decreased from 0.69 to about 0.45, or to about 65 per
cent of what is was before implementation.
Most importantly, given that λ equals about 4.7 and L equals about 450
thousand hectares in the median scenario, and given that before implementation
1 − P equaled 0.36 and q equaled 0.69, equation 2.18 implies that annual
exportation of drugs, D, was about 530 thousand kilograms before the imple-
mentation of Plan Colombia. In contrast, given that after implementation 1−P
has equaled about 0.25 and q has equaled about 0.45, equation 2.18 implies
that D has averaged about 237 thousand kilograms after implementation. Thus,
the calibration of the model in the median scenario implies that the combined ef-
fect of the successes of the Colombian armed forces on these two fronts of the war
against drug producers has been to decrease exportation of cocaine from Colombia
to about 44 per cent of what it was before the implementation of Plan Colombia.
Finally, under the parameter values of the median scenario, we estimate that
total expenditure by the Colombian government in the two fronts of the war
against drug producers has been about $580 million dollars (0.7 per cent of Colom-
bian GDP).9
Table 1 presents all the results described so far using diﬀerent values of φ,c,
and h for the calibration of the model.
9Actual total defense expenditure in Colombia (includes National Police, the Defence Min-
istry, and other entities) has been, on average, 2.7 per cent of GDP in the last few years. The
results of the calibration of the model imply that the Colombian state has spent 26% of its total
defense budget in the two fronts of the war against the producers of illegal hard drugs.
173.2. Plan Colombia: How Eﬃcient?
Given the values of λ and n, our assumptions in the median scenario that Φ
equals one and that φ equals two, h equals $4 billion, and our estimates of Ω, ω,
and L, we calculate (using equation 2.22) that after the implementation of Plan
Colombia (∂M/∂D)Ω has equaled about $800, and we calculate (using equation
2.25) that after the implementation of Plan Colombia (∂M/∂D)ω has equaled
about $3770. In other words, we estimate that the marginal cost to the United
States of decreasing the exportation of drugs from Colombia by subsidizing the
Colombian armed forces in their conﬂict with the drug producers over the control
of arable land has been about $800 per kilogram, whereas the marginal cost to the
United States of decreasing the exportation of drugs from Colombia by subsidizing
the Colombian armed forces in their eradication and interdiction eﬀorts has been
about $3770 per kilogram.10
These estimates suggest that the allocation of subsidies to the Colombian
armed forces under Plan Colombia has not been eﬃcient. The marginal cost of
decreasing the exportation of drugs by subsidizing the Colombian armed forces in
their eradication and interdiction eﬀorts appears to have been, on average, almost
ﬁve times as large as the marginal cost of decreasing the exportation of drugs by
subsidizing the Colombian armed forces in their conﬂict with the drug producers
over arable land. Note from Table 1 that in some of the cases (depending on the
diﬀerent assumptions on the parameter values) the marginal cost of reducing the
exportation of cocaine by subsidizing the Colombian armed forces in their conﬂict
with the drug producers over arable land is negative. In other words, under some
parameter values, there is a net marginal beneﬁt to the US of increasing the
subsidies to the armed forces in their conﬂict with the drug producers over the
control of arable land. Although this result seems paradoxical, a marginal increase
in the subsidy from the interested outsider to the conﬂict over arable land causes
(1 − P) to decrease, and as a result the optimal amount of resources spent
10As a point of reference, according to DEA (2003), the average price of a kilogram of cocaine
in the U.S. in 2001 ranged between $15000 (in Los Angeles) and $25000 (in New York).
18by the Colombian government in eradication and interdiction, z, also decreases
(third term in the bracketed expression in equation 2.20). For a given subsidy
to eradication and interdiction eﬀorts, 1 − ω , a decrease in z decreases the total
costs to the interested outsider of subsidizing the war against the drug producers.
As we have pointed out, under an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies (∂M/∂D)Ω
and (∂M/∂D)ω would be equal. Equating expressions 2.22 and 2.25, an eﬃcient




















The calibration of Ω and ω involves the solution of equation 3.2 together
with equation 2.19 (after replacing for Z and z from equations 2.13 and 2.15
respectively), for given values of c,Φ,φ,h,L,M,and n.
Using the assumptions in the median scenario that Φ equals 1, φ equals 2,c
equals $10000, h equal $4 billion, our corresponding estimate of L, and taking
M to be equal to $2/3 billion, Table 2 presents the results of the calibration of the
eﬃcient subsidies and compares the results with the calibrated current subsidies.
In the median scenario (columns 1 and 2 in Table 2) we ﬁnd that an eﬃcient
allocation of $2/3 billion in subsidies to the Colombian armed forces would have
had Ω equal to 0.41, rather than 0.57 as we calibrate it was in fact, and would
have had ω equal to 0.47, rather than 0.37 as we calibrate it was in fact. These
calculations suggest that an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies would have subsidized
the Colombian armed forces more heavily in their conﬂict with the drug producers
over the control of arable land than in their eradication and interdiction eﬀorts,
rather than vice versa as seems to have been in fact the case.
How much more would exportation of cocaine from Colombia have decreased,
relative to what it was before the implementation of Plan Colombia, with an
eﬃcient allocation of $2/3 billion in subsidies to the Colombian armed forces?
From equations 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18 we ﬁnd that, in the median scenario, the
19fraction of contested land on which coca has been cultivated, 1−P, would have
decreased to about 0.19, as compared to the actual outcome of 0.25, which would
have implied an “extra” decrease of about 17 per cent relative to what it was before
the implementation of Plan Colombia. We also ﬁnd that the fraction of potential
drug production and exportation that avoided eradication and interdiction, q,
would have increased to about 0.51, as compared to the actual outcome of 0.45,
an increase of about 9 per cent relative to what it was before the implementation of
Plan Colombia. Finally, we ﬁnd that average annual exportation of cocaine from
Colombia would have decreased to about 205 thousand kilograms, as compared to
the actual outcome of about 237 thousand kilograms, an “extra” decrease of about
6 per cent of what exportation was before the implementation of Plan Colombia.
This estimate suggests that ineﬃciency in the allocation of subsidies has not
had a big eﬀect on the success of Plan Colombia. This conclusion, however, is
sensitive to the assumed values of c, h, and φ. For example, as indicated in
T a b l e2 , g i v e nt h ea s s u m p t i o n st h a t Φ equals one and that φ equals two, h
equal $4 billion, we estimate that an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies would have
resulted in an additional decrease in the exportation of cocaine from Colombia,
relative to what it was before the implementation of Plan Colombia, by only about
0.03 if c equals $12000, by about 0.06 if c equals $10000, but by about 0.16
if c equals $8000.
4. Summary
In this paper we develop a model of a war against the producers of illegal hard
drugs. The ﬁrst front of this war is the conﬂict between the state and the drug
producers over the control of arable land that is suitable for cultivating the crops
that constitute the raw material for producing cocaine. In the second front, the
state attempts to eradicate the crops (for instance, by the aerial spreading of
herbicides), to interdict drug shipments, and to destroy the workshops where
cocaine is produced and the landing strips from which drugs are exported. We
20label this front the “eradication and interdiction” front of the war against drug
producers. Importantly, the model includes an interested outsider who uses both
a stick and a carrot to strengthen the resolve of the state in its war against the
producers of illegal hard drugs.
According to the results of the calibration of the model, the implementation
of Plan Colombia has decreased the exportation of cocaine from Colombia, on
average, from 532 thousand kilograms before the implementation to 237 thou-
sand kilograms after the implementation. Also, we estimate the marginal cost
to the United States of reducing the exportation of cocaine by one kilogram by
subsidizing the Colombian armed forces in the conﬂi c to v e ra r a b l el a n dt ob e ,o n
average, $800, and the marginal cost of reducing the exportation of cocaine by one
kilogram by subsidizing the eradication and interdiction eﬀorts of the Colombian
armed forces to be, on average, $3770. Eﬃciency in the allocation of subsidies
would imply that these two marginal costs should be equal. Hence, our estimates
suggest that the allocation of subsidies between the two fronts of the war against
drug producers in Colombia has not been eﬃcient.
An eﬃcient allocation of subsidies would imply an increase in the subsidy to
the Colombian state in its conﬂict with the drug producers over the control of
arable land, and a decrease in the subsidy to eradication and interdiction eﬀorts.
The results of the calibration of the eﬃcient subsidies implies that the fraction
of land controlled by the drug producers would have been 19 per cent lower than
it actually was, the fraction of drugs that could have been exported successfully
would have been 9 per cent higher then they actually were, and, most importantly,
total drug production and exportation would have been, on average, 6 per cent
lower than it actually was. Depending on the assumed parameter values used
in the calibration of the model, the extra decrease in total drug production and
e x p o r t a t i o nt h a ta ne ﬃcient allocation of subsidies would have implied can be as
low as 3 per cent, but as large as 16 per cent. Finally, under an eﬃcient allocation
of subsidies we estimate that the marginal cost to the United States of decreasing
the exportation of cocaine by one kilogram would be, on average, $1900.
21Appendix
Allowing for a positive value of b, the annual proﬁt from each hectare of land used
to cultivate the most proﬁtable benign crop, we have
X =








































Assuming that Φ equals one, that φ equals two, and that c equals $10000,
if b is about $400,11 then our estimates of 1 − P before implementation and
after implementation would be about 0.35 and 0.24, rather than 0.36 and 0.25,
as we calculated under the assumption that b equals zero, and our estimates of
D before implementation and after implementation would be about 536 thousand
kilograms and about 245 thousand kilograms, rather than 532 thousand kilograms
and 236 thousand kilograms, as we calculated under the assumption that b equals
zero. The results of the calibration of the model under the median parameters
scenario are presented in Table 3 (columns 3 and 4). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3
reproduce the results obtained in Table 1 under the median scenario.
11Agricultural GDP per hectare of arable land in Colombia is about $800. To calibrate the
model for the case where b>0 we make the (standard) assumption that half of this number is
the remuneration to land holders. That is, b is about $400. Results are very similar if we use
the proﬁts per hectare of land in the coﬀee sector in Colombia.
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24Facts
[(1-P)L] after implementation  = 110900 ha
[(1-P)L] before implementation = 163300 ha
λ = 4.7  kg/ha
M = $ 2/3 billion 
n=2
after  before after before after before after before after  before  after  before  after  before 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Assumptions
Φ 1 1 1111111 1 1 1 1 1
φ 22 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 222 2 2 2 2 2
c $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 8,000 $ 8,000 $ 12,000 $ 12,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000
h $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $2 billion $2 billion $6 billion $ 6 billion
Results
Ω 0.57 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.57 1.00 0.59 1.00 0.56 1.00 0.53 1.00 0.59 1.00
ω 0.37 1.00 0.32 1.00 0.39 1.00 0.30 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.24 1.00 0.46 1.00
L (has.) 452,200 452,200 452,200 452,200 452,200 452,200 493,920 493,920 421,550 421,550 349,950 349,950 531,790 531,790
1-P 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.36 0.22 0.33 0.26 0.39 0.32 0.47 0.21 0.31
q 0.45 0.69 0.35 0.63 0.53 0.74 0.38 0.66 0.52 0.72 0.46 0.78 0.45 0.64
q after/q before
D (kgs.) 236,640 532,151 183,700 482,800 274,090 566,921 195,550 509,582 269,660 550,038 239,540 596,924 234,130 490,693
D after/D before
(∂M/∂D) Ω  ($) -798 -1,882 14 -1,882 -1,183 -1,882 197 -1,723 -1,513 -2,019 149 -1,216 -1,532 -2,401





Median scenario Variations in φ Variations in c Variations in h
0.65 0.56 0.71 0.57 0.72 0.59 0.70
0.44 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.48Facts
λ = 4.7  kg/ha






























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Assumptions
Φ 111 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1
φ 22 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 222 2 2 2 2 2
c $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 8,000 $ 8,000 $ 12,000 $ 12,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000
h $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $2 billion $2 billion $6 billion $ 6 billion
Results
Ω 0.57 0.41 0.57 0.33 0.57 0.44 0.59 0.29 0.56 0.46 0.53 0.24 0.59 0.49
ω 0.37 0.47 0.32 0.37 0.39 0.51 0.30 0.33 0.42 0.52 0.24 0.29 0.46 0.55
L (has.) 452,200 452,200 452,200 452,200 452,200 452,200 493,920 493,920 421,550 421,550 349,950 349,950 531,790 531,790
1-P 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.12 0.26 0.23 0.32 0.18 0.21 0.18
(1-P) eff./(1-P) current
q 0.45 0.51 0.35 0.39 0.53 0.59 0.38 0.40 0.52 0.57 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.49
q eff./q current
D (kgs.) 236,640 205,090 183,700 130,420 274,090 248,900 195,550 114,700 269,660 254,970 239,540 146,800 234,130 221,930
D eff./D current
(∂M/∂D) Ω  ($) -798 -1,867 14 -1,147 -1,183 -2,094 197 -714 -1,513 -2,291 149 -1,092 -1,532 -2,303
(∂M/∂D) ω   ($) -3,770 -1,867 -3,638 -1,147 -3,896 -2,094 -3,741 -714 -3,712 -2,291 -3,962 -1,092 -3,636 -2,303
Table 2
1.13 1.10 1.12 1.06 1.10 1.10 1.10
0.87 0.71 0.91 0.59 0.95 0.61 0.95
0.86 0.56 0.86
Efficient Subsidies
0.77 0.65 0.81 0.55
Median scenario Variations in φ Variations in c Variations in hFacts
[(1-P)L] after implementation  = 110900 ha (1-P) after imp.
[(1-P)L] before implementation = 163300 ha (1-P) before imp.
λ = 4.7  kg/ha
M = $ 2/3 billion 
n=2
after before  after before 




c $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000 $ 10,000
h $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion $4 billion
b 0 0 $ 400 $ 400
Results
Ω 0.57 1.00 0.60 1.00
ω 0.37 1.00 0.37 1.00
L (has.) 452,200 452,200 466,610 463,720
1-P 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.35
q 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.70
q after/q before






Median scenario with b=0 Median scenario with b= $500
= 0.68